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Introduction 
Entrepreneurship has become vital to the success of a company and economic growth. 
There is increasing evidence to show significant correlation between entrepreneurship and 
economic growth. Countries in the world are experiencing a surge of interest in the formation 
of new businesses especially in the developing world. This escalating interest of 
entrepreneurship has become a focal strategy of regional and national economic development 
in many regions and countries. Strong emphasis on enterprise development as a platform for 
economic development is thus an important dimension in development policy. 
The People’s Republic of China (hereafter China), an original planned economy, has 
demonstrated rapid economic success during the past few decades. Entrepreneurs are playing 
a significant role in contributing to national economy. Despite the limited access to resources 
and financial capital and services, Chinese entrepreneurs have continuously presented their 
strength and energy. In addition to their strength and energy, Chinese entrepreneurs’ success 
to a certain degree results from China’s previous and current policies which are intended to 
create an environment in which entrepreneurship and new small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) can thrive and flourish.  
Previous studies examining China’s enterprise development, especially in the high-
tech sector, have focused primarily on the Torch Program and associated science and 
technology parks and business incubation programs.1 This focus, unfortunately, overlooks the 
systematic approach taken to promote technological innovations and business creation in 
China, though it does correctly reflect the significant role of the Torch Program. The purpose 
of this paper is therefore to describe and evaluate China’s previous and existing science and 
technology innovation and enterprise development policies and programs in the past 20 years. 
This study can not only greatly enhance the understanding on entrepreneurship fostering and 
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1 Chan, K., & Lau, T. “Assessing technology incubator programs in the science park: The good, the bad and the 
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system in a small-sized region: A clustering model in Zhongguancun science park”, Technology Analysis and 
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development in China, it can also shed light on other developing countries’ increasing 
emphasis and efforts on entrepreneurship and SMEs development.  
 
Entrepreneurship, Enterprise Development, and Economic Growth 
Entrepreneurship is not synonymous with new ventures, but these two are closely 
related. The origin of entrepreneurship stems from the discussion on entrepreneurs, who, 
depending on various theories, are able to discover profit opportunities2  or act on those 
opportunities. 3  Entrepreneurship is necessary to the creation of new (and often small) 
businesses.4 Gartner suggested that the creation of new organizations is what entrepreneurship 
is all about.5 Entrepreneurs, through their entrepreneurial activities, accumulate and assemble 
external resources to construct new businesses. 6  Through their new businesses, 
entrepreneurial individuals also channel and transform their entrepreneurial ambitions and 
qualities into actions. In these cases, small firms are a behavioral manifestation of 
entrepreneurship7 or an organizational extension of individual entrepreneurial actions.8 New 
and often small firms also greatly contribute to the flourishing of entrepreneurship as 
important catalysts or actors in technological innovations;9 as agents of change in market 
                                                 
2  Kirzner, I. Competition and entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973. Kirzner, I. 
Perception, opportunity, and profit: Studies in the theory of entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1979. 
3 Baumol, W. J. “Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive”, Journal of Political Economy, 
98(5), 893-921, 1990. Schumpeter, J. The theory of economic development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1934. 
4 In rare cases, new businesses may not be small due to sectoral characteristics and entry barriers, for example, 
airline or mining industry. 
5 Gartner, W. B. “’Who is an entrepreneur?’ is the wrong question”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 13, 
47-68, 1989. 
6 Morgan, G. Images of organization. Thousand Oaks, MA: Sage Publications, 1996. Vesper, K. H. New venture 
strategies. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990. 
7 Hebert, R. F. & Link, A. “In search of the meaning of entrepreneurship”, Small Business Economics, 1(1), 39-
49, 1989. Wennekers, S. & Thurik, R. “Linking entrepreneurship and economic growth”, Small Business 
Economics, 13(1), 27-55, 1999. 
8Lumpkin, G. & Dess, G. “Clarifying the entrepreneurial orientation construct and linking it to performance”, 
Academy of Management Review, 21, 135-172, 1996. 
9 Acs, Z. & Audretsch, D. B. Small firms and entrepreneurship: An east-west perspective. Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. Schumpeter, J. A. The theory of economic development. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1934.  Nelson, R. “Incentives for entrepreneurship and supporting institution”, 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 120(4), 646-661, 1984. Winter, S. “Schumpeterian competition in alternative 
technological regimes”, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organizations, 5, 287-320, 1984. 
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structure and competition environment;10 and as critical forces in industrial restructuring and 
national competitive advantage upgrading.11 
 
China’s Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Development 
China’s entrepreneurship and enterprise development has progressed in two directions 
at the same time. The first thread is to gradually liberalize the market toward a more market-
oriented economy and consequently increase the proportion of private enterprises which have 
been typically comprised of SMEs. The other thread is to encourage technological innovations 
and support technology-based enterprises through strong technology-oriented strategies, 
policies and operational incubation programs. 
Market Liberalization and SMEs  
China’s private sector or enterprises started to grow after the economic reform in 1978 
which was intended to gradually introduce market force into China’s traditional centrally 
planned economy. Before the reform, there was almost no private and individual business due 
to the socialist reconstruction in the 1950s, although there were about nine million individual 
business units in the early period of 1949. The turning point of private enterprise development 
began in 1978 after China officially signified market liberalization as well as economic 
modernization and growth. Emphasis was laid on social and economic incentives for private 
individual businesses (getihu) which was expected to revive China’s individual businesses, 
contribute to economic growth, and improve people’s living standards. Despite the intention 
to develop individual enterprises, a number of restrictions were applied which to a great 
extent limited China’s enterprise expansion.  
The boom of private sector development arrived after Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern 
Tour” in 1992. Following Deng’s initiative, both central and local governments started to 
implement preferential policies for private enterprise development. These policies focused 
mainly on encouraging foreign investment and channeling domestic capital into China’s 
private individual business sector. Since 1992, the numbers of entrepreneurs, private firms, 
employed workforce, and enrolled capital and taxation grew at a stunning pace. It was 
estimated that by 2001 the total number of private businesses was more than three million. 
                                                 
10 Beesley, M. & Hamilton, R. “Small firms’ seedbed role and the concept of turbulence”, Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 33, 217-232, 1984. Brock, W. & Evans, D. The economics of small business. New York: Holmes & 
Meier, 1989. 
11 Hart, D. (Ed.) The emergence of entrepreneurship policy: Government, startups, and growth in the U.S. 
knowledge economy. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Porter, M. E. The competitive 
advantage of nations. New York: Free Press, 1990. 
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More than 20 million workers were employed by private enterprises and more than 311 
million participated in individual business activities.12  
Science, Technology, and Enterprise Programs 
Parallel to its efforts to gradually yet continuously liberalize its market, China has also 
adopted a technology-oriented strategy to promote entrepreneurship and enterprise 
development. Since the late 1970s, China has been reconstructing its science, technology, and 
enterprise development. The primary goals were to invest and promote basic research, to 
apply them, and to advance and contribute to China’s economic reform. Various programs, 
therefore, have been carried out to strengthen China’s basic science and technology 
capabilities and to commercialize research output. These programs include the National 
Technology Research and Development Program (1986), which is also referred as “863” 
program, the Spark Program (1986), the Torch Program (1988), and the Program of Key 
Basic Research (1997), which is also called “973” program. As in other countries, these 
programs are closely related, linking technological innovations to entrepreneurship assistance 
in order to promote high-tech start-ups and to facilitate commercialization of technological 
innovations. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Major Science and Technology Programs in China 
Program Goals Funding Sources 
“863” program 
Promote R&D in information, 
biotechnology, advanced 
manufacturing technologies 
Government budget: about six 
billion yuan over the last 15 years 
Spark program 
Technological support for 
township-village enterprises in 
China’s rural areas 
Government budget and bank loans
Torch program Support for high-tech companies located in high-tech zones 
Bank loans 
“973” program Support for major basic research projects 
Government budget 
 
This technology-oriented strategy and associated enterprise assistance programs 
echoed Porter’s national competitiveness building and upgrading theories.13 Despite China’s 
lower-cost advantage, China is facing increasing competition from other developing countries 
that have utilized the similar advantage of lower labor cost as this advantage may be easily 
duplicated in other labor-rich or resource-abundant countries. In addition to the international 
labor cost competition, China has also faced rising wages domestically, particularly in large 
                                                 
12 Liu, Y. Development of Private Entrepreneurship in China: Process, Problem and Countermeasures. Presented 
at the conference of “U.S.-Japan dialogue on Entrepreneurship in Asia”, 2002. 
13 Porter, M. op cit. Porter, M. On competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, 1998. 
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and industrial cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. The increasing labor cost in 
China’s coastal region may push some of the firms into China’s interior areas or lose some 
firms to other labor-intensive countries, thus jeopardizing national competitiveness. 
These various programs implementing China’s technology-oriented enterprise 
development strategy have different policy orientations. The “863” plan was devoted to 
critical technologies which could have significant impacts on China’s economic reform or 
even national security. Large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were then chosen to carry out 
the “863” plan due to the criticality of the technologies, the ability of SOEs to gather capital, 
human, and technological resources, and the dominance of SOEs in China’s economy. In the 
following two years after its initiation in 1986, 500 million RMB yuan were mobilized and 
channeled into the program and thousands of scientists participated in the research. 14  
Consequently, major breakthrough was documented in the fields of new materials, 
biotechnology, information technology, lasers, and space technology. The research 
breakthrough, however, was not smoothly transferred into final outputs in production 
processes. This was partly because of large SOE’s rigid bureaucratic management 15  and 
partly because of the underdeveloped connections between research and production in 
China.16 
ent skills, and to transform them into specialized, 
competitive, and fully-fledged enterprises.  
                                                
Beside the “863” plan, the Spark program is also an integral part of China’s science, 
technology, and enterprise development policies. The major targets of the Spark program 
were China’s huge rural population and the vast number of Township and Village Enterprises 
(TVEs). TVEs, which were primarily developed by peasants, were created to employ surplus 
agricultural labor force, financially support the peasants, and promote economic growth in the 
rural areas. The development and contribution of TVEs, however, were constrained by their 
crude technological abilities, low quality products, and unprofessional management. The 
primary goals of the Spark program were, therefore, to introduce and spread scientific and 
technological “sparks” to the rural areas, to help the TVEs with new technologies, new 
designs, new equipment, and new managem
To achieve these goals, a number of policy measures have been implemented. First, 
the Spark program has intended to support key applied techniques. For example, the initial 
support for livestock production has been extended to disease prevention, slaughter 
management, and even meat packaging and cooking. This all-inclusive approach well 
facilitated the diffusion of new techniques in the rural economies. Second, the Spark program 
was intended to improve TVEs’ competitiveness and reap scale efficiency by offering 
incentives for TVEs to combine their efforts on research, marketing, and warehousing. Finally, 
 
14 Segal, A. Digital dragon: High-technology enterprises in China, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 
15 Walcott, S. M. Chinese science and technology industrial parks, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003. 
16 Segal, A. op cit. 
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the Spark program has established Spark Technology Zones, concentrating limited resources 
to enhance their technological and investment environments. These zones, like China’s other 
specialized zones, enjoy advantageous policy treatments on technologies, talented personnel, 
taxation, and infrastructure. These scattered zones also constitute an industrial production 
network in China’s rural areas. 
d the Asian Development Bank, provided crucial 
financial support to the Torch program. 
DZs can enjoy preferential taxation, financial, personnel, and 
import-export policies.18         
 areas in light of their large number of professionals, 
universities, and research institutes.  
                                                
Parallel to the efforts dedicated to large SOEs, policy attention was also drawn to 
small and nongovernmental enterprises. Complementary to the “863” plan, the Torch program 
was aimed to support new start-ups in high-tech innovation and commercialization. Unlike the 
“863” plan, the target technology of the Torch program was not those highly critical ones, but 
a wide range of new technologies which were advanced, readily producible, and marketable. 
In addition, the Torch program had much broader funding sources than the “863” plan. Beside 
the national government, local governments, China’s domestic banks, and international 
organizations, like the World Bank an
Another important component of the Torch program is high-tech and/or new 
technology development zones (HTDZs). The purposes of the creation of the HTDZs were 
two fold. On one hand, these HTDZs served as an additional funding source to the Torch 
program, linking promising new high-tech start-ups to any potential domestic and overseas 
capital resource. On the other hand and more importantly, these HTDZs worked as 
“incubators of high and new technology”.17 Tremendous efforts have been implemented to 
improve the investment and innovation environment in these HTDZs. For example, qualified 
high-tech enterprises in the HT
Despite the importance of the HTDZs, they were not evenly distributed in China: 
HTDZs were geographically concentrated in China’s coastal and central regions. This is 
because of three considerations. First, this spatial concentration has been consistent with 
China’s unbalanced development strategy which gave development priority to the coastal 
areas over the central and western ones. Second, this spatial arrangement of HTDZs can fully 
take advantage of solid industrial bases in China’s coastal and central regions. Since the goal 
of HTDZs is to promote the development of small high-tech enterprises, the spatial closeness 
between these small enterprises and existing industrial bases enable them to mimic successful 
operational practices. Finally, this spatial distribution can borrow scientific and technical 
strengths in the coastal and central
 
17Ibid., p.33. 
18 For an extended discussion on preferential policies in HTDZs, please refer to 
http://www.most.gov.cn/English/programs/torch/menu.htm. 
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To further strengthen China’s basic research ability and to meet the challenges of a 
knowledge-based economy, China launched its 973 program (National Basic Research 
Program) in 1997. The 973 Program has gathered extensive expertise to implement innovative 
studies of major scientific issues to meet China’s long-term economic needs and to upgrade 
China’s science and technology research capability. Tremendous efforts have been devoted to 
scientific and technological issues which are closely related to China’s sustainable economic 
development and superior national competitiveness, for example, information technology, 
energy production and reproduction, environment protection, and population and health. By 
2002, the 973 program has deployed 133 projects, attracted and appointed 175 well-
recognized scientists, and mobilized financial support up to 20-30 million RMB yuan.19   
Incubator Programs 
China’s incubator programs experimented prior to the initiation of the Torch program 
but have been its integral part since its inception. The original form of China’s business 
incubation programs was High and New Technology Venture Service Centers (HNTVSC), 
which were established and administered jointly by the State Science and Technology 
Commission (predecessor of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)) and local 
governments. The first HNTVSC (Wuhan Eastlake Venture Center) came into existence in 
1987 in Wuhan, Hubei Province. Since the inception of the Torch program in 1988, 
HNTVSCs have been incorporated into the Torch program, primarily through the HTDZs. 
Over the past two decades, China has witnessed continuously increasing numbers of high-tech 
incubators – from merely 73 in 1994 to 534 in 2005. The increase of incubation facilities 
strongly suggests that infrastructure to support the SMEs development has expanded. These 
incubators have played a crucial role in technological commercialization, job and wealth 
creation, and economic growth (see table 2). 
China’s high-tech incubators can be roughly categorized into five types. They are 1) 
comprehensive/general technology business incubators; 2) specialized technology business 
incubators; 3) university incubators; 4) incubators for returned overseas students and/or 
scholars; and 5) international business incubators. The majority of Chinese incubators fall into 
the first category. Comprehensive/general technology business incubators assistant SMEs in 
the transfer and commeralization of technological achievements through various services, 
such as floor space and facilities, financing, marketing, and other business management 
consultation and training, laws and policies, and sometime, direct financial support. All these 
create a favorable environment for the transformation of scientific achievements and the 
creation and development of SMEs. Specialized technology business incubators focus on 
 
                                                 
19 National Basic Research Program “Profile of 973 program,” Retrieved on May 14, 2007 from World Wide 
Web: http://www.973.gov.cn/English/Index.aspx. 
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Table 2: Growth of China’s Incubators: 1994-2005 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
No. of High-Tech Incubators  73 73 80 100 100 110 
No. of Tenant Companies (1,000) 1.4 1.9 2.5 2.7 4.1 5.3 
Average No. of Tenant Companies per Incubator 19 25 31 27 41 48 
Total Employees (1,000) N/A N/A N/A 45.6 68.9 91.6 
Average No. of Employees per Tenant Company N/A N/A N/A 17.1 16.7 17.3 
No. of Graduating Companies N/A 174 284 177 491 618 
Percentage of Graduating Companies (%) N/A 9.4 11.5 6.6 11.9 11.7 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
No. of High-Tech Incubators  131 280 378 431 464 534 
No. of Tenant Companies (1,000) 7.7 12.8 21.0 27.3 33.2 39.5 
Average No. of Tenant Companies per Incubator 59 46 56 63 72 74 
Total Employees (1,000) 128.8 263.6 363.4 482.5 552.4 717.3 
Average No. of Employees per Tenant Company 16.7 20.6 17.3 17.7 16.6 18.2 
No. of Graduating Companies 836 1,224 2,213 2,774 2,737 4,097 
Percentage of Graduating Companies (%) 10.9 9.5 10.5 10.2 8.2 10.4 
 
business assistance in a single or a few closely related technological fields, for example, bio-
medical incubators, software incubators, and new material incubators. University incubators 
are mainly established within university campuses and generally set up to take advantage of 
technological resources in universities. Businesses within such incubators are typically 
founded by university faculty and students based on their research results. These university 
incubators have demonstrated their superior abilities to link readily available faculty and 
students to entrepreneurship assistance, to accelerate the development of innovative high-tech 
firms, and to facilitate the commercialization process of technical innovations. Incubators for 
returned overseas students and/or scholars, initiated in 1997, focus primarily on attracting 
Chinese scholars and students abroad to start their own ventures in China. International 
business incubators promote international cooperation by both helping foreign enterprises 
enter the Chinese market and by helping Chinese domestic businesses explore overseas 
markets and develop international operations.   
In addition to the government financial supports, China’s incubators are also 
sponsored by other financial sources, including university subsidies, SOEs, private funds, and 
international donor organizations. But these additional fund sources only account for a small 
portion of the entire finance.20 The dominant position of public investments on incubators in 
                                                 
20 Chandra, A., He, W., & Fealey, T. “Business incubators in China: A financial services perspective”, Asia 
Pacific Business Review, 13(1), 79-94, 2007. 
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China results partly from the inadequate venture capital in China.21  As a result, most of 
Chinese incubators, which are exclusively funded by the governments, are not for profits.  
Despite the dramatic increase of incubators in China, their successful role in 
connecting entrepreneurship and technological innovations, and their significant impacts on 
technological commercialization, China’s incubator programs still have their weaknesses. 
First, China’s incubators over-rely on government financial sources. This over-reliance may 
enable the governments to impose their political mandates on the operations of incubators. 
For example, incubator managers may avoid supporting “risky” start-ups, due to their concern 
of losing future governmental resources.22 Second, excessive attention and emphasis have 
been put on incubators’ “hardware,” like brand new buildings, new roads, and broadband 
Internet. As a result, the improvement of their “software” is overlooked. Though physical 
infrastructures are important to the development of new enterprises, the major benefits of 
incubators come from the nurturing environment and professional assistance provided by 
well-trained staff in incubators.23 In China, unfortunately, professional management assistance 
is lacking. For example, an incubator has only 16 staff members on average, who have to be 
responsible for over 50 tenant companies at the same time. 24  Due to the insufficient 
entrepreneurship support, the essential advantage of incubators may merely be lower rent 
costs and preferential bank loans. 25  The lack of management talent in incubators may 
seriously limit their positive impacts in China.  
Third, most of China’s incubators, directed by the not-for-profit operation rationale, 
do not provide their services on a cost-recovery basis and may, therefore, face long-term self-
sufficiency problems. In addition, the not-for-profit approach may not offer enough 
motivations for incubator staff to provide their best services.26 Finally, there is not enough 
attention to new kinds of incubators. Scaramuzzi identified three “generations” of incubators, 
i.e., science and technology parks are the first generation, and virtual incubators and incubator 
networks are the second and third generation respectively.27 The beauty of the latter two types 
of incubators is that they can, with the help of advanced information technology, mobilize and 
                                                 
21  Scaramuzzi, E. “Incubators in developing countries: Status and development therefore perspectives”, 
Retrieved on May 14, 2007 from World Wide Web:  
http://www.infodev.org/library/WorkingPapers/incubators.pdf.  
22 Harwit, E. “High technology incubators: Fuel for China’s new entrepreneurship?” China Business Review, 
29(4), 26-29, 2002. 
23  Scaramuzzi, E. “Incubators in developing countries: Status and development therefore perspectives”, 
Retrieved on May 14, 2007 from World Wide Web:  
http://www.infodev.org/library/WorkingPapers/incubators.pdf. 
24  Lalkaka, R. “Rapid growth of business incubation in China lessons for developing and restructuring 
countries,” Retrieved on May 14, 2007 from World Wide Web:  
http://techpark.ir/Parks/English/Articles/Lalkaka.htm.    
25 Harwit, E. op cit  
26 Stough, R. R. “The rise of global enterprise development: Patterns in China and India”, Journal of Indian 
Management and Strategy, 7(6), 2003. 
27 Scaramuzzi, E. op cit. 
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make full use of existing management talent across China and deliver entrepreneurship 
assistance to virtually anywhere in China in a timely and inexpensive manner.   
In sum, since the late of 1980s, China has implemented systematic policies to promote 
technological innovations and enterprise development. Consequently, China has established 
various programs targeted especially at different types of technologies and enterprises. 
Among these efforts, a large number of incubators have been set up to provide a nurturing 
entrepreneurship environment to high-tech start-ups. Despite the rapid increase of these 
incubation facilities, the available facilities can only work with a small portion of new 
enterprises, and the remainder of promising companies is still lacking sufficient 
entrepreneurship assistance. Further, many incubators have insufficient staff and program 
support to assist their companies, which suggests that the benefits of these incubation 
programs may be limited to mere rent reduction over current market rates.  
 
Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Enterprise development has become a central component of regional and national 
development strategy around the globe. This paper reviewed China’s existing policies and 
programs to promote science and technology innovations and enterprise development. Among 
China’s enterprise development policy approaches, tremendous efforts have been made to 
enhance China’s science and technology innovation capabilities and commercialization of 
technological innovations. These efforts not only cover both critical and daily technologies but 
also support a variety of enterprises, like, SOEs, TVEs, and university spin-offs. In addition to 
the programs targeted at science and technology capacities in China, China has also 
established a comprehensive incubator program to boost enterprise development. This 
program has experienced rapid growth and demonstrated significant impacts on 
entrepreneurship development, job creation, and economic growth. The positive effects of this 
incubator program, however, are limited by insufficient management assistance, over-reliance 
on public finance, overemphasis on “hardware” side of incubators, and inadequate virtual 
incubators and incubator networks. With regard to the weaknesses of China’s existing 
incubator program, it is recommended that future enterprise development programs stress the 
cultivation of nurturing investment and entrepreneurship environments, to attract private fund 
sources and venture capitalists, and to promote virtual incubators and incubator networks. 
In addition to the general policy recommendations for China’s future enterprise 
development, China’s western regions should also focus on another two policy suggestions. 
First, the primary focus of the incubator planning should be on “software” instead of 
“hardware.” Constrained by insufficient resources, China’s western region does not have to be 
obsessed by physical infrastructure of incubators. Instead, efforts should be made to cultivate 
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a conducive investment and entrepreneurship environment in incubators. These efforts may 
include adequate incubator staff as well as professional entrepreneurship assistance on 
business plan and daily management operations.  
The other policy suggestion would be to develop and strengthen virtual incubators and 
incubator networks. Compared to traditional physical incubators, such as science and 
technology parks, these two types of incubators do not require huge initial investments on 
infrastructure construction and improvement. A relatively small amount of money, therefore, 
is needed to initiate an incubator and, more importantly, to provide entrepreneurship services 
and nurture enterprises. Beside the cost advantage, virtual and incubator networks can also 
bring entrepreneurship assistance into the rural areas in China’s western region where it is 
hard to recruit management talent and to run incubators on a cost-recovery basis because of 
the dispersed nature of new enterprises.  
